亵渎学术自由 孔子学院小巫见大巫
洋五毛在西方大学以中宣部的文风挑战西方学术严谨规范
作者： 吴建国
近年來，西方一些大學掀起了一股反孔子學院的浪潮。孔子學院的課堂上，不能以不同於中共的觀點來談論中國的問題，這被認為是對西方學術自由的褻瀆。
依筆者所見，褻瀆學術自由，孔子學院不過是小巫見大巫。在西方大學的洋五毛們正試圖以中宣部的宣傳方式挑戰西方學術的嚴謹性和規範性，使西方學術界滲入中共的思維邏輯。
這種試圖已經在一些學術論文中呈現，並獲得一股洋五毛勢力的支持。澳洲學者海倫•法利（Helen Farley）博士就是實驗者之一。在她的一系列學術文章中，廣泛地採用了中宣部的文風。其表現特徵為，第一，在闡述一個“事實”時，要么不提供證據支持，或不指出其信息來源; 第二，直接使用中共單方面的言論作為唯一證據; 第三，直接捏造證據。
法利的這些文章都是在為中共的人權和宗教迫害背書。她的文章隨即被翻譯成中文、發表在中文網站上，以大張旗鼓地宣揚外國學者對中共宗教迫害，如對迫害法輪功的支持。
缺乏嚴謹性的學術
筆者在本文選擇了法利博士其中一篇文章，以展示她的中宣部文風。法利以澳洲昆士蘭大學(University of Queensland) 歷史、哲學和宗教系名譽高級宗教研究員和南昆士蘭大學(University of Southern Queensland) 副教授的身份，於2014年在英文學術書籍《神聖自殺（Sacred Suicide）》一書中發表了一篇題為《死於誰之手？法輪功和自殺（Death by whose hand? Falun Gong and suicide）》的文章。她還在另外一個在美國發行的學術刊物上發表了一篇幾乎雷同的文章，只是題目不同而已。
加拿大馬尼托巴大學（University of Manitoba）副教授特里•拉塞爾（Terry Russell）看了這些文章後指出，“法利博士至少可以被指控為對學術嚴謹性的褻瀆，她文中對法輪功的許多說法都缺少應有的證據。”
澳洲悉尼大學教授瑪麗亞•辛格（Maria A. Fiatarone Singh）有著類似的看法，“（法利）文章的寫作方式絕對是有問題的，在闡述一些事實時（如自焚和大規模的自殺），把一些似是而非的事當成事實。”
然而，這些文章卻獲得澳洲一些大學行政官員的支持，以及一些西方學者明地暗地偏袒。還受到這些文章的編輯——挪威特羅姆瑟大學（University of Tromso）教授詹姆斯•劉易斯（James R. Lewis）歇斯底里地維護。
這些文章的製作和發表，以及所獲得的強烈支持，其後面是否有中共的金錢誘惑？相信讀者在看完本文後，自然能得到答案。
天安門自焚事件
法利在《神聖自殺》書中那篇文章大量使用了2001年天安門自焚事件作為她論點的證據。為此筆者介紹一下該事件的背景。
據中國新華社報導，2001年1月23日下午，有五人涉嫌在天安門廣場自焚。其報導稱這些自焚者是法輪功學員，並指責法輪功的教義導致了這樣的悲劇。
該報導獲得了其預期的效果：許多人相信了自焚者是法輪功學員，於是許多尊重和同情法輪功的國人，其態度轉變為反感法輪功。
但兩週後，華盛頓郵報發表了一篇報導，揭示了完全不同的事實。寫這篇報導的華盛頓郵報記者菲力蒲.潘（Phillip Pan）親自到其中一個自焚者劉春玲的家鄉開封實地調查。劉春玲的鄰居們告訴他，他們從來沒有看見過劉春玲練法輪功。
事後，新唐人電視台根據此案的現場錄像製作出一部影片《偽火》，通過對現場錄像的分析，提出了54個證據證明天安門自焚事件是中共導演的一出用於構陷誹謗法輪功的惡作劇，這五個自焚者也根本不是法輪功學員。該片曾在國際社會獲獎。
2001 年8 月14 日，國際教育發展組織在聯合國會議上明確指出，“天安門自焚”是中共一手導演的，是對法輪功的構陷。並向與會的代表提供《偽火》的錄像光碟。當時在場的中共代表面對確鑿的證據啞口無言。
中共當局沒有回應這54個證據，其媒體悄悄地停止了對自焚事件的播報。十多年過去後，中共對無法反駁的54個證據不甘罷休。於是就出現了一些洋學者來證明自焚者就是法輪功學員，中共又開動其宣傳工具，在網站和電視台再次炒作這一偽案。
法利的論證方法
法利是怎樣證明這五名自焚者就是法輪功學員呢？她在文章的一開始說道，“法輪功的教義明確禁止自殺，但在2001年，五名抗議者在天安門廣場自焚，導致兩人死亡。”
她在文中多次重複這段話，以這種方式告訴讀者，天安門自焚的五名抗議者就是法輪功學員，把其當作是一個不爭的事實，但沒有提供任何證據來支持她的說法。
她還在文中提到，“法輪功的領導層很快就否認與該（自焚）事件有任何關係。（法輪功）從美國開始，推出了自己的視頻（《偽火》），指控中國政府偽造了這一事件。”
這說明她了解，這些自焚者的身份是不確定的，至少法輪功方面提供了54個證據否認這些人是法輪功學員。而且還有華盛頓郵報的調查，以及國際教育發展組織的聲明。但她還是不斷以不爭的事實的口氣，指自焚者就是法輪功學員。在通篇文章中，她沒有提供任何確鑿的證據來證明這一點，但在最後的結論中，她宣稱這是“毫無疑問”的。
她的邏輯就是，因為2001年1月有人在天安門自焚，所以自焚者就一定是法輪功學員，所以法輪功學員就是要自殺。
法利文中另一個引述的證據是，“（中共）當局還認為，有數百名法輪功修煉者破腹開膛尋找法輪，以響應五個功法的練習。”
事實上，中共當局對這一指控，從來沒有提供任何證據。如果真有數百人破腹開膛，即使有幾十人這樣幹，他們可以很容易地獲取證據。這是中共當局自己也不想證明的謊言，卻成了法利博士引用的證據。
捏造證據
作為中宣部的文風，捏造證據是常規，這位大博士也不敢怠慢這一常規，在文中多處捏造證據，尤其是對法輪功教義的捏造。法輪功的教義都公開並以多種語言發表在falundafa.org的網站上，偽造的教義一眼就能識破。
她在文中繞了許多圈子，試圖證明她的論點：“法輪功的教義明確禁止自殺，但還是有人自焚或自殺。”她還用了不少篇幅把文革中的自殺現象——這個與其論點毫不相干的話題——闡述了一番，但還是論證不了她的論點。於是在文中的後面就宣稱法輪功有這麼一個教義：“由於現代社會的墮落，世界末日即將來臨，只有真正的法輪功學員才能獲救贖。”
她沒有指明這段教義來自何處。事實上，在法輪功的所有教義中，找不到這個說法。但她卻利用這段偽造的教義得出一個結論，法輪功學員會因此教義而自焚或自殺。
另一個造假例子是，她宣稱：“雖然法輪功的領導層試圖與2001年自焚事件撇清關係，但大規模的自殺和自焚一直在持續。”
同樣，她沒有提供任何證據證明“大規模的自殺和自焚一直在持續”，也沒有說明這個信息來自何處。在她的國家澳大利亞，有數千名法輪功學員，沒有一個自殺或自焚的案例。她對這些事實都視而不見。
法利在其文中還提到，在中共的監獄裡有一些法輪功學員自殺死亡的事件，但她沒有提供證據來證明這些死亡是否出於自殺。
大量的證據充分證明，被中共監獄關押的許多法輪功學員經常遭受酷刑。一些釋放後的學員出面指證，有中共高層指示，如果有法輪功學員被刑訊死亡，打死就算自殺。
如果法利打算使用這種“自殺”作為證據，證明法輪功學員會自殺，這將是對受害者及其家屬更深的傷害。
背後的交易？
法利博士稱她是昆士蘭大學歷史、哲學和宗教系名譽高級宗教研究員，但她的宗教研究學者身份是可疑的。
讀者只要在LinkedIn上看看她的工作經歷，就能發現，在過去10年中，她的學術研究的範圍主要集中在教育和教育技術方面，很少涉及宗教研究。在2013年，她獲得澳洲政府4百萬澳元的資助，用於一個電腦教學項目。這個項目為期三年，在南昆士蘭大學實施。她應該需要全職投入這個項目。
目前，她還是另外一個由南昆士蘭大學牽頭的跨學區教育研究項目的領導。鑑於法利繁重的工作任務，很難理解她在最近幾年有任何時間搞宗教研究。瑪麗亞•辛格教授也質疑，法利怎麼會有那麼多的專業資歷？又是兽医科学信息，又是通信技术，還有宗教学…
然而，那些發表法利文章的中文網站上，卻只介紹她是昆士蘭大學名譽高級宗教研究員，從事了許多宗教研究課題並發表了許多宗教研究文章。
雖然我們沒有直接的證據證明法利及其一些澳洲大學行政官員與中共當局之間有交易，但她的昆士蘭大學名譽高級宗教研究員的頭銜，看起來像是專為那些中文網站推廣她的文章而安上的。同時她是否是這些文章的作者也是可疑的，有可能她只是提供她的名字來充當作者，而真正的作者另有其人。
善意交流失敗
在2015年3月，筆者等人給法利發了一封郵件，指出了她文章的問題，希望這一切是因為她被誤導，並希望能與她坦率地討論這些問題。
然而我們等了兩個月也沒有收到她的回复。於是我們向她工作的大學有關部門，以及她所發表文章書籍和刊物的編輯團隊成員發了郵件，告知他們法利文章的問題，並徵求他們如何處理此事的意見。
南昆士蘭大學校長揚•托馬斯（Jan Thomas）教授很快回复說，對法利文章的指控沒有依據，並把法利學術造假的做法歸結為不同的觀點而已。
另外一位澳洲大學的行政官員來電話，要筆者停止向該大學發這個揭露法利文章的郵件，否則他要報警。筆者要他發一個郵件來說明他的要求，但他拒絕了。
而法利文章的編輯劉易斯教授在看到我們的郵件後，以大首長的口氣，軟硬兼施地要我們停止對這些文章的質疑。軟的方面他說法輪功學員是修煉寬恕諒解的，就應該停止質疑。硬的方面他說如果我們不閉嘴，他就要說我們是在威脅、騷擾和攻擊法利，是打著法輪功學員身份的中共特務在敗壞法輪功的聲譽。並威脅如果我們不閉嘴，他還會繼續寫這類誹謗法輪功的文章。
他的邏輯是，他們製作這類誹謗法輪功的文章，是在維護法輪功的聲譽，他還自稱是法輪功之友，而我們質疑他們文章的問題，就是在敗壞法輪功的聲譽，就是中共特務。之後他還發來一篇新的誹謗法輪功的文章，說這是我們不閉嘴的後果。新文章還指我們干涉了他們的學術自由。他的這篇新文章，同法利的那些文章的特徵完全一樣，都是中宣部的文風。因此筆者懷疑，劉易斯很可能是所有這些文章的真正作者。
法利在西方的不同英文書刊發表了一系列這類文章，劉易斯全是這些書刊的編輯，這也是為什麼這些嚴重不符學術規範的文章能順利發表的原因。
為了迫使我們閉嘴，劉易斯除了耍盡了流氓之外，還叫囂說我們反對他們的這些學術造假，簡直是蚍蜉撼大樹。好像全天下都是中共的了，因此學術文風也都應該跟從中宣部了。
Chapter 11
Death by Whose Hand?
Falun Gong and Suicide1
Helen Farley
Introduction
The teachings of Falun Gong explicitly forbid suicide; yet in 2001, five protesters
set themselves ablaze in Tiananmen Square resulting in two deaths. The suicides’
stated aim was to bring the world’s focus onto the repression of the movement
by the Chinese government. Falun Gong spokespeople were quick to defend
founder Li Hongzhi, saying that the movement strictly forbids suicide in
accordance with the traditional Chinese belief that suicide is an affront to the
ancestors. They claimed that the Chinese government had staged the suicides in
order to stir up public opinion against the movement. Indeed, the tide of public
opinion did turn against Falun Gong and its founder (Bell and Boas 2003: 285).2
Yet despite Falun Gong’s stated opposition to suicide, the movement does
encourage its adherents to refuse medicine or medical treatment, and some
regard this refusal of treatment to be suicidal. Chinese state media seized upon
Li’s writing in which he expressed that illnesses are caused by karma, and claimed
that in excess of one thousand deaths were the direct result of adherents following
Li’s teachings. Authorities also claimed several hundred practitioners had cut their
stomachs open seeking the Dharma Wheel that turns in response to the practice of
the five meditative exercises characteristic of the movement. Indeed, many of their
fellow followers had been arrested in Tianjin, following condemnation of their
movement by physicist He Zouxiu of the Chinese Academy of the Sciences. He
had claimed that Falun Gong had been responsible for several deaths (Bejsky 2004:
190).This chapter examines the complex relationship between Falun Gong and the
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published as Helen Farley, “Self-Harm and Falun
Gong,” Journal of Religion and Violence, 1(3) (2013): 259–75.
2 Some commentators deny that these self-immolations even took place. See Munro
(2002: 267).
216 Sacred Suicide
Chinese government, exploring the reality behind the claims and counterclaims
regarding the former’s stated opposition to suicide. This is contrasted with Falun
Gong writings that encourage adherents to refuse medical treatments in order to
rid themselves of karma.
On Sunday, April 25, 1999, Falun Gong first came to the attention of western
media when some 15,000 adherents calmly surrounded the seat of the Chinese
government at the Zhongnanhai compound adjacent to the Forbidden City in
Beijing (Penny 2003: 643; Lee 2011: 209). The movement was outlawed in 1999,
which signaled the beginning of a bipartisan propaganda war between Falun Gong
adherents and the Chinese government, each claiming the other was responsible
for deceptions, atrocities, and conspiratorial plots (Biggs 2005: 205). Falun Gong
or Falun Dafa is a religious movement that arose from the qigong boom of the
1980s (Ownby 2003: 233). “Qigong fever” was the name given to the phenomenon
that gained over one hundred million practitioners, some 20 percent of the urban
population in China, practicing qigong’s characteristic breathing and meditation
techniques (Palmer 2007: 6; Palmer 2008: 79). Falun Gong emerged in 1992 as
part of this pre-existing qigong movement. Falun Gong means literally “Great Way
of the Wheel” or the “Dharma Wheel Discipline” (Fisher 2003: 296).
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the history of attitudes to suicide
in China. There are conflicting accounts of how the act is viewed; sometimes it
is condoned as the act of a martyr or as a protest, and at other times it is clearly
an affront to the ancestors and thus is roundly condemned. An examination
of the emergence of Falun Gong from the larger qigong movement in the
early 1990s follows. Most people in the West think of Falun Gong adherents
as peaceful meditators, cruelly suppressed by the Chinese government. The
veracity of this claim is scrutinized, along with the central tenets of Falun Gong
belief and practice. Falun Gong adherents have a strong belief in fate, destiny
and karma that is congruent with their attitude to death, but particularly to
suicide. Though Falun Gong founder Li Hongzhi speaks against suicide, his
teachings may inadvertently condone suicide in two particular circumstances:
in self-immolation as a form of protest and in the refusal of adherents to accept
medical treatment when ill, sometimes resulting in death.
Suicide in China
The suicide rate in China is one of the highest in the world and suicide has often
played a prominent role in Chinese culture (Fei 2011: 213). Indeed, suicide
has featured in accounts of defeated military leaders and monarchs during the
Death by Whose Hand? 217
shifting of dynasties, wars, the uncovering of corruption, and unfavorable family
circumstances (Lo 1999: 624). Depending on the viewpoint of the narrator,
suicide was variously depicted as an act of fervent loyalty, as an extreme form
of moral protest, or as a strategy for escaping abusive or unjust social or familial
situations (Lee and Kleinman 2005: 296, Fei 2011: 214). By way of example, in pre-
Communist China, Mao Zedong wrote about women who took their own lives in
order to escape forced marriages. These suicides he considered to be symptomatic
of larger societal problems, such as the double standards around chastity and
promiscuity in men and women, the inability to pursue love, and other facets
of patriarchy that disempowered women. He viewed suicide as a symptom of a
society that had caused people to lose hope (Lee and Kleinman 2005: 295). It is
true that in contrast to most other countries, the suicide rate for women in China
is significantly higher than for males (Zhang and Xu 2007: 185).
Suicide rates soared during the Cultural Revolution. During the mass arrests
and detentions between 1966 and 1969 by the Red Guards, official reports
claim that around 35,000 people died from all causes, though the actual figure is
probably closer to 400,000 (Lester 2005: 100). Teachers jumped from windows
and those detained in labor camps and prisons found ingenious ways of ending
their lives (ibid.: 100–101). These suicides were acts of protest against a brutal
regime, often precipitated by violence and torture. Even so, suicide is generally
eschewed in the Chinese tradition as polluting. It is viewed as an unnatural
death and, consequently, to be shunned. In some cases, the unfortunate victim is
not to be mourned. The consequences of suicide also include economic hardship
for the family through the loss of that person’s productivity and reproductive
power (Lee and Kleinman 2005: 296). Suicide notes are often characterized by
a deep sense of remorse and a sense of unfulfilled filial responsibility towards
parents and the family (ibid.: 297). In other contexts, Chinese cultural attitudes
to suicide are to some extent ambiguous: it can be supported as pro-social or
frowned upon as anti-social. In the context of Confucian thought, it is morally
wrong to preserve one’s life at the expense of benevolence and justice (“ren” and
“yi”). Life is good, but is not the supreme good; death is evil, but it is not the
supreme evil (Lo 1999: 626).
Suicide can also be viewed as a practical solution to a problem and in this
context it is supported. For those who believe in reincarnation, the temptation
to begin life anew is sometimes too great. Many women, especially in rural areas,
wish to reincarnate as a man (Zhang and Xu 2007: 189). This tension between
opposing viewpoints while allowing for creative ambiguity also encompasses the
challenges of normlessness and hypocrisy. For this reason, the community and
family members might view the suicide differently (Lee and Kleinman 2005:
218 Sacred Suicide
295). Suicide can be viewed as a means of defying social power and as a strategy
to respond to the inter-subjective struggles of commonplace social experience.
Social forces may prevail in defiance of individual purposes and aspirations, and
in turn, suicide may convey a resistance to the imposition of that authority (ibid.:
300–301). For example, Lucien Bianco wrote that one of the most common
ways to exact revenge upon a callous creditor was to commit suicide in front
of his door. In doing so, it caused the landlord to lose face (Bianco 1978: 280).
The reportage of suicide in an authoritarian state is rarely straightforward.
In some instances, administrations have suppressed the real number of deaths
ascribed to suicide in order to limit criticism of the state. Until the late 1980s,
there was very little reliable data on suicide in China (Lee and Kleinman 2005:
295; Xin Ma et al. 2009: 159). In some cases, World Health Organization
estimates of Chinese suicide rates are up to 40 percent higher than Chinese
government estimates (Phillips et al. 2002: 835). Conversely, these same regimes
may attribute suicides to a particular group or groups in order to discredit them
or to garner public support against them. This is what Falun Gong practitioners
have accused the Chinese government of doing in regards to several cases of
self-immolation reported in the media both in China and the West. Certainly,
Falun Gong attracted much criticism following the alleged self-immolation of
practitioners (Bell and Boas 2003: 285).
The Birth and Substance of Falun Gong
Falun Gong emerged onto the Chinese religious landscape in 1992, founded
by Li Hongzhi (Palmer 2007: 6; Penny 2012a: 35). It emerged from the qigong
movement that had transfixed China since the 1980s. Qigong can be described
as a system for improving and maintaining health based on ideas found in
traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) and other aspects of Chinese culture.
The practice of qigong involves practitioners observing a wide range of physical,
mental, and breathing exercises. “Qi” can be translated as vital energy, and “gong”
as skill, so qigong is literally the skill of developing vital energy so as to obtain
good health (Xu 1999: 967; Rahn 2002: 41).
By 1991, there was considerable criticism and cynicism about qigong. The
Chinese government began to vigorously monitor qigong masters, associated
literature and qigong organizations with the goal of uncovering “false” or
“unscientific” qigong (Ownby 2008: 166; Chen 2003: 509). It was amid this
widespread disenchantment with qigong that Falun Gong emerged and was able
to gain traction, attracting millions of adherents across China (Ownby 2000).
Death by Whose Hand? 219
Li Hongzhi deliberately distanced Falun Gong from qigong by arguing that the
aim of Falun Gong was not about the accumulation of extraordinary powers
such as clairvoyance or supernatural healing, as had been the focus of much
qigong practice. He also emphasized that it was not specifically about health,
though good health was sure to follow rigorous practice. In contrast to qigong,
the goal of Falun Gong was to purify one’s heart and attain spiritual salvation
(Lu 2005: 175; Palmer 2007: 219). The earliest writings about qigong described
body postures and illustrated appropriate techniques, but did not contain any
moral content. By way of contrast, the writings of Li Hongzhi contain moral
content to accompany the somatic technologies (Ownby 2000). Supporters
of both Falun Gong and qigong were equally strident in their protests that the
two sets of practices were independent. Though it emerged from the ideas and
practices of qigong, Falun Gong has characteristic exercises and ideologies that
differentiate it from qigong (Irons 2003: 254; Palmer 2007: 27–8).
Given Falun Gong’s interesting status within the People’s Republic of China,
it is useful to examine the background of its charismatic founder. Seen as an
enlightened master by Falun Gong adherents, he is portrayed by authorities as evil
incarnate, an unscrupulous liar and charlatan. Li Hongzhi completed his primary
school education in Changchun in 1969, graduating from junior high school at
eighteen and applying to join the Communist Youth League. Former schoolmates
and teachers recall him as an ordinary child who was unexceptional academically
in school (Thornton 2005: 260). The Chinese government is adamant that Li
Hongzhi learned how to perform qigong exercises in 1988. Falun Gong sources
dispute this, instead saying that he was drilled from age eight in those disciplines
by various Taoist and Buddhist masters (Lu 2005: 178; Penny 2003: 648–9).
Whatever the situation, it is certain that Li did travel to Beijing in 1992 to participate
in research with a group at the China Qigong Scientific Research Society (Tong
2009: 8). Not long afterwards, Li founded the Falun Gong Research Society with
his associates Li Chang, Wang Zhiwen, and Yu Changxi. Accreditation followed
and the new organization was recognized as a branch of the larger organization,
which in turn publicized Falun Gong training sessions (Tong 2002: 640). After
1994 when Li left China, these sessions were no longer conducted. According to
Falun Gong sources, the reason for their discontinuation was to enable Li to devote
all of his time to the study of Buddhism. But it is likely his departure had more to
do with the mounting opposition Falun Gong was attracting within Communist
Party and government circles (Ownby 2008: 167). By this time, Falun Gong had
tens of millions of adherents enticed by its negligible admission criteria, lack of
membership fees, simple exercises, and assurances of health and salvation (Chang
2004: 4; Irons 2003: 250; Penny 2012b: 7). Li Hongzhi finally left China for
220 Sacred Suicide
the United States in 1996, just ahead of government persecution. He established
himself in New York, where he resides and actively directs Falun Gong’s operations
(Burgdoff 2003: 335).
Falun Gong adherents believe that Li possesses supernatural powers such
as the capacity for levitation and that he is able to manifest miracles. In order
to promote this image, he associates himself with characters in popular martial
arts media and fantasy literature (Xiao 2001: 125, 6). Further, Li claims to use
telekinesis to insert the falun, or the “wheel of the law,” into the abdomens of
those who follow him (Hongzhi 1999a: 130). Li claims that negative energy is
expelled as this wheel turns, and positive energy is generated, ensuring sound
health and an absence of disease (Fisher 2003: 295; Palmer 2003: 353). In order to
keep the wheel turning, adherents must regularly perform the five characteristic
meditative exercises of Falun Gong, thereby removing any accumulation of bad
karma (Thornton 2005: 260–61). To further support this process of cultivation,
Li directs “law bodies,” or fashen, which are complete, independent, and realistic
individuals which are flexible and invisible. He directs the fashen to protect
followers suffering from illness, healing them in the process. Those practitioners
serious about adhering to Falun Gong must uphold the purity of their devotion,
ceasing any other sort of spiritual practice. Serious adherents must also avoid
even reading about or thinking about other forms of spirituality in order to
avoid deformation of the rotating dharma wheel (Lu 2005; 177–8, 180).
Falun Gong, also known as Falun Dafa, is an uneasy fusion of several preexisting
traditions—namely Taoism, Buddhism, and Chinese folk religion—
which have been remixed into something never before seen in China (Thornton
2005: 260; Lu 2005: 174). The breathing and meditative aspects of Falun Gong
closely resemble the breathing exercises used to increase potency and longevity in
Taoism (Chang 2004: 39). Even so, there are numerous references to UFOs and
science, giving the movement a more contemporary appearance (Ackerman 2005:
500). This is reinforced by Falun Gong’s extensive use of modern communication
technologies including email and the Internet (Leung 2002: 782). In the West,
Falun Gong is known primarily as a harmless set of meditational exercises that
are readily accessible to novice practitioners. In reality, it is first and foremost a
rigorous system of morality (Penny 2003: 644; Chan 2004: 676; Ackerman
2005: 501; Burgdoff 2003: 336). Physical rejuvenation and good health are only
the result of strict moral practice (Ownby 2000; Madsen 2000: 243). Followers
strive to foster the time-honored spiritual values of truthfulness, compassion, and
tolerance through the practice of particular exercises and meditation (Hongzhi
1999b: 59–61; Madsen 2000: 243). The practitioner directly experiences the
supreme nature of the cosmos energized from within by the energy of the turning
Death by Whose Hand? 221
falun when he or she becomes suitably developed (Leung 2002: 764). The purging
of negative karma accrued from this life and previous incarnations, together with
the accrual of virtue as accepted in Falun Gong, allows the cultivation of spiritual
advancement (Ownby 2008: 93). In spite of the extensive moral teachings in
Falun Gong, followers and leaders alike claim that Falun Gong is not a religion,
but a movement that encourages spiritual and moral cultivation (Keith and Lin
2003: 629–30; Madsen 2000: 243).
In Falun Gong, everything is either good or evil, and individuals are either
true practitioners or ordinary people. Those who remain faithful to Li’s teachings
are true practitioners with a fated relationship to Falun Gong and access to the
highest spiritual truth. If they are able to remain faithful to Li’s teachings and resist
seductions along the way, this elite group will attain enlightenment. Any deviance
from this path and they will resume their pathetic lives as ordinary people, destined
for annihilation at some time in the not-too-distant future (Lowe 2003: 268).
To most observers, these apocalyptic and millenarian characteristics make Falun
Gong resemble a religion (Chang 2004: 59, 60; Burgdoff 2003: 334).
Suicide and Falun Gong
Li Hongzhi has repeatedly criticized suicide as a sin, as part of a larger prohibition
against taking life. According to the tenets of Falun Gong, God has a plan laid
out for every individual. Not every detail of a life is planned out but the major
milestones such as birth and death are planned to take place at certain immutable
times. Obviously, Falun Gong practitioners are able to influence their own lives,
but it is very difficult to extend a lifespan beyond an allotted time. By killing
oneself before time, an individual is effectively sidestepping the divine plan. The
act of suicide, while temporarily removing a person from suffering, is an act that
accrues even more negative karma for an individual, which increases the amount
of karma to be eliminated in a future incarnation. An individual would be better
advised to endure the suffering, thereby helping to eliminate negative karma
and not attracting more karma through suicide (Hongzhi 1999a: 27). Before a
person dies, preparations are occurring for that individual’s next incarnation. A
mother is pregnant, awaiting the birth of her child and the fetus is awaiting the
consciousness of the individual. If someone dies by their own hand before their
designated time, then that individual must wait between lives in a nether world
until they have spent the allotted time of their own predestined lifespan. Once
that time has passed, the individual will move into the next incarnation but with
an additional accumulation of karma (Penny 2012b: 116).
222 Sacred Suicide
Though theoretically adherents of Falun Gong are opposed to suicide,
there are two instances that confuse the situation. The first involves the selfimmolations
that took place in 2001 as a protest against the persecution of
Falun Gong by the Chinese government. The crackdown that occurred after
these events also sparked a number of mass suicides in detention centers. The
second is in Falun Gong adherents’ refusal to seek medical help when they are
ill. This has resulted in a number of deaths from a variety of medical disorders
that remained untreated. Though suicide is not condoned in Falun Gong, there
are certain philosophies and circumstances that predispose followers towards
suicide in particular contexts.
Self-immolation
Suicide by burning is an intensely dramatic method of terminating one’s life
(Romm et al. 2008: 988). Self-immolation, while involving an individual
intentionally killing him or herself as with other forms of suicide, is usually done
for or on behalf of a larger cause. An act of self-immolation is not about injuring
anyone else or inflicting material damage. Rather, it is an extreme form of protest.
Thus, it is usually done either in a public place or with an accompanying letter
directed to the public or to specific political leaders (Biggs 2005: 173–4). These
individuals are attempting to appeal to others and to incite potential sympathizers
(ibid.: 201). This kind of protest in not unknown in China; there is a long history
of suicide as protest in China, for example, women committing suicide to protest
unfair or cruel familial situations (Lee and Kleinman 2005: 296; Fei 2011: 214).
On January 23, 2001, the eve of Chinese New Year, seven Falun Gong
followers traveled over 550 kilometers from Kaifeng to Tiananmen Square, to
set themselves alight in front of cameras and journalists from the Cable News
Network (CNN) (Biggs 2005: 176; Thornton 2005: 266; Ching 2001). One
of the protesters, a man sitting on the ground, was enveloped by fire; another
four consisting of two mother and daughter pairs, lurched about with their arms
raised as flames consumed their bodies. Police hurried to extinguish the flames
and assembled a barrier to block the view of onlookers, but police were not
fast enough; a 36-year-old woman died from her burns. Initially, the Chinese
government attempted to quash news of the event, even though western
journalists had been present and had recorded it; the tape was immediately
confiscated by authorities (Chang 2004: 16–17). But soon the government
realized they could use this as an opportunity to muster opposition to Falun
Gong. A week after the incident had occurred, state television broadcast some
Death by Whose Hand? 223
footage showing the 12-year old daughter of one of the practitioners, rolling
around in agony. The government framed the deaths as “cultic suicide,” and
discredited them as a form of protest (Biggs 2005: 205).
The leadership of Falun Gong were quick to deny any connection to the
incident. From the United States, it released its own video, charging the Chinese
government with fabricating the incident (ibid.: 206). Adherents abroad
claimed that the self-immolators were not true practitioners (Thornton 2005:
266), because both Li and the movement had consistently opposed any form of
killing, including suicide, as a means of reaching salvation (Chang 2004: 17–18).
This attempt to disassociate itself from the act was probably counter-productive.
In all probability, the leadership of Falun Gong did not encourage or sanction
these actions; but it also seems unlikely that it was part of a Chinese government
conspiracy to discredit the organization. Interestingly, some of the adults had
participated in previous protests. Even in light of the government manipulation
of the event’s coverage to the detriment of Falun Gong, two more people set
themselves alight in the months following (Biggs 2005: 205). On February 16,
another adherent immolated himself on a residential street in Beijing. By the
time the police arrived just a few minutes later, Tan Yihui, just 25 years old, a
shoe-shiner from Hunan province, had died (Chang 2004: 17–18). The selfimmolations
continued when on July 1, Luo Guili set himself alight in a city
square in Nanning in southern China. Barely 19 years old, he died the following
day of severe burns and heart and lung failure (ibid.: 21).
Prior to the propaganda campaign resulting from the self-immolations,
people marveled at the Chinese government’s repression of such an insignificant
and benign organization. Subsequent to it, people thought that the government’s
actions were justified. Authorities had shown the 12-year-old girl’s face on
television for more than a month, and public opinion shifted to oppose Falun
Gong. It seems unlikely that the state could have attained such success if children
had not been involved in the immolation. Such a move allowed the government
to step up their repression of the organization, which included the systematic
torture of its followers. The Chinese government claimed that around 1,700
Falun Gong followers had committed suicide; evidence, they reasoned, of
Falun Gong’s cultish evil (Bejesky 2004: 155; Biggs 2005: 206). The Chinese
media carried many anti-Falun Gong diatribes. Children were compelled to
attend anti-Falun Gong lessons, and 12 million school students contributed
to a signature campaign, signing a declaration asserting their disbelief in cults
and opposition to them. Thousands of workers attended mass meetings and
signed petitions condemning the movement (Chang 2004: 18). Within just
six months of the shocking incident, Falun Gong was effectively disempowered
224 Sacred Suicide
within China (Richardson and Edelman 2011: 380). During the course of 2002,
the maimed survivors were paraded around and were part of a press conference.
“Falun Gong is indeed an evil cult and it led me to this,” uttered Chen Guo, the
daughter of the woman who died (Thornton 2005: 266). Footage showing the
young girl, her face badly burned and bandaged, calling out for her mother, was
shown repeatedly on television (Chang 2004: 18).
In response to the crackdowns, on June 20, 2001, some sixteen Falun Gong
followers held in a Harbin labor camp attempted suicide by hanging themselves
with ropes created from bed sheets. Of these, ten women died. These followers
were among thirty who had previously gone on a hunger strike, for which they
had their sentences extended by six months. In addition, authorities conceded that
eleven Falun Gong members in a re-education center had attempted mass suicide,
with three dying from the effort. For its part, the Falun Gong leadership claimed
that fifteen followers in that same camp died as a result of torture (ibid.: 28).
In light of the Chinese government’s persecution of Falun Gong, Li Hongzhi
fashioned an apocalyptic ideology to motivate his disciples to instigate and
participate in civil disobedience. It was estimated that by February 2002, 365
practitioners had died while in custody, and more than 50,000 were either in
prison, labor camps, or mental hospitals (Palmer 2003: 355). Would-be activists
were not formally invited to become a member of an activist team. There were no
formal instructions on how to dissent. Civil disobedience actions were planned
at local meetings. The heroic roles of the protester and the martyr were exhibited
via testimonials and stories at “Experience-Sharing Conferences” (Palmer
2003: 353–4). Li increasingly talked extensively about “Fa-rectification,” the
process by which the cosmos would be rid of evil. This process would ensure
the annihilation of evil doers—in this context, those responsible for suppressing
Falun Gong. The process had already begun on other levels and would soon
come to humanity. This was the struggle before that final battle (Penny 2012b:
156–60). Hundreds of practitioners chose to place themselves in situations
where they died painfully (Palmer 2003: 362).
After the political heat intensified in response to the immolations, Falun
Gong adherents displayed posters on power poles in Shenyang City and
dropped fliers in letter boxes in Beijing back streets, disputing the government’s
reports of the self-immolations and condemning them for turning a blind eye to
poverty and unemployment. Residents were inundated with video footage and
automated phone calls that played recordings criticizing the government. Angry
followers also hacked into television broadcasts (Chang 2004: 21; Thornton
2005: 266; Rahn 2002). The apocalyptic teachings of Li Hongzhi could well
have precipitated the self-immolations through a veiled call to civil disobedience
Death by Whose Hand? 225
and the promise of salvation for martyrs. Li teaches that the “Ending Period of
Catastrophe” is almost here, that contemporary society is degenerate and will be
purged. The only ones who will be saved are those who are genuine Falun Gong
practitioners. Li called Jiang Zemin, then president of the People’s Republic of
China, “the highest representative of the evil force in the human world,” who
is being manipulated by higher beings to persecute Falun Gong. According
to Li, only when evil is eliminated can practitioners return home through
consummation to the Falun Dafa paradise (Rahn 2002).
Refusing Medical Treatment
Though not as dramatic as the self-immolations, many Falun Gong members
have effectively committed suicide through a refusal to seek medical treatment
when they were ill. There is considerable social pressure on Falun Gong followers
to abandon conventional medicine, though not all inevitably do so. Li does not
explicitly tell adherents not to consult doctors, saying each person must make
their own decision (Hongzhi 1999a: 41–2). He asserts that disease is caused by
negative karma (Palmer 2003: 363). In Falun Gong, karma is recognized as a
discrete substance, and is black in color. The first goal of the process of cultivation
is to transform this karma into another substance, called de, which literally means
“virtue.” In contrast to karma, de is white in color. Li himself then transforms
de into a form of energy called gong that gradually infuses all the body’s physical
structures, converting it into what is known as a “pure white body” in Falun Gong
texts (Penny 2012b: 42). This accounts for most of the karma in the body.
The process of the removal of the remainder of the karma is called “xiaoye”
and is achieved through the practice of Falun Gong (Wessinger 2003: 221).
According to the tenets of Falun Gong, physical disorders are actually
precipitated by the ejection of negative karma from the body. To employ
conventional medical treatment to treat the condition serves only to mask the
pain associated with this elimination. In this way, karma can re-enter the body
where it will lie dormant until it re-appears, possibly causing a more severe illness.
Illness represents an opportunity to purge karma from the body. Hence the pain
and suffering of sickness becomes a spiritual issue rather than a medical one
(Burgdoff 2003: 341; Porter 2003: 157). A true practitioner does not suffer real
illness, only xiaoye. Afflictions should not be approached with fear and dread
but following the principles of forbearance, calm, and joy at the potential of
being provided with an opportunity to progress spiritually (Fisher 2003: 300).
Li considers that illness, along with birth, old age, and death, all have karmic
226 Sacred Suicide
reasons and demand karmic retribution. If a person is ill, then the karmic debt
needs to be paid before wellness can be regained (Hongzhi 2003: 296).
In Li’s opinion, dubious moral values have caused a variety of diseases that
neither hospitals nor medicine can cure. The corruption of society has led to
this situation (ibid.: 298). He further claims that medicines can poison a person
and that they cannot remove the karma that is causing the illness (ibid.: 298–9).
Instead, hospitals and medicine simply mask the spiritual illness, while healing
the physical illness. The retained karma will cause the illness to reappear in the
latter part of life (Porter 2003: 157). According to Li, when an individual dies,
the karma is pressed into the reincarnated person and is not obvious to start
with. The sickness will appear to be caused by some trigger in the physical world
but this is really not the case. If the person dies again without having purged
that karma through enduring the illness, then the illness will manifest in the
individual in a subsequent lifetime (Hongzhi 2002: 38–40). He likens the human
body to a tree in which the growth rings contain the sickness karma. He further
asserts that no person is able to deal with all of the sickness karma at the same
time and so it must be dealt with incrementally (ibid.: 40). Interestingly, Li does
not confine his criticism to Western medicine. He also claims that conventional
qigong also delays dealing with karma. Further, he warns that if a person has
accumulated much negative karma over several lifetimes and continues to accrue
more by doing bad things, then sooner or later heaven will not permit the debts
to remain unpaid and the person faces the complete destruction of the body and
soul, that is, complete annihilation (ibid.: 41).
In this context, Li also refers to his fashen who, as mentioned earlier, he can
direct to take on the role of removing negative karma from practitioners. If the
practitioners are ordinary people, he will not direct the fashen to help them; to
do so would be a waste. A practitioner condemns him or herself to ordinariness
by taking medicine instead of taking the opportunity to clear karma. Illness is
a test and fashen are only to help those who pass that test (Lu 2005: 177–8;
Hongzhi 1999a: 41–2). When adherents die of their illness even when they
have refused medical care, Li covers himself by asserting that the person must
have been an ordinary person and it would have been their time to die. It is not
worth extending the life of an ordinary person. Li himself must acknowledge
his disciples; conducting the meditation exercises and otherwise following the
teachings of Falun Gong does not guarantee that Li will acknowledge that person
as a disciple. The fundamental nature of that person has not been transformed
because the practice was not approached with sufficient diligence (Hongzhi
1998: 33–5). Li has also expressly prohibited Falun Gong practitioners from
healing others, which they would be capable of if they were advanced enough
Death by Whose Hand? 227
in their own cultivation. Healing others transfers the karma from the ill person
onto the healer and, therefore, retards his or her own cultivation. It also robs
the sick individual of the opportunity to begin cultivation themselves, the only
sure way to health (Penny 2012b: 42).The Chinese government claims that more
than 1,400 adherents have died because they rejected medical care due to their
Falun Gong beliefs (Cheung 2004: 24).
Conclusion
The allure of Falun Gong lies in its claims to wed traditional Chinese culture to
modern science and beyond, to the science of Master Li Hongzhi that would
supplant the scientific knowledge crudely accrued thus far (Ownby 2008: 93).
Falun Gong emerged from the larger movement of qigong through the 1990s, but
is different in important ways. Both have a millenarian structure and the idea of
a universal bliss in salvation. Qigong’s vision is of a blissful future for humanity,
but Li Hongzhi tells of an apocalyptic end of the universe with salvation taking
place in another dimension (Palmer 2007: 239). Body technologies are common
to both and yet with qigong the path of accomplishment is based on paranormal
powers, while in Falun Gong the way to salvation is via moral and spiritual
discipline (Hongzhi 1999b: 7; Palmer 2007: 239).
Though Li Hongzhi and Falun Gong condemn suicide as an attempt to
disrupt God’s plan and because of the excessive negative karma accrued, certain
philosophies and teachings predispose adherents to effectively commit suicide
in certain contexts (Hongzhi 1999a: 27). The self-immolations of a number of
Falun Gong practitioners in 2001, undoubtedly an act of protest against the
Chinese government’s crackdowns on the organization also became an appealing
option for adherents because of Li’s apocalyptic messages. He advocated “farectification,”
increasingly focused on retribution against those who suppressed
Falun Gong and the struggle that preceded it (Penny 2012a: 156–60). Though
not explicitly encouraged, adherents heard stirring tales of martyrs, protesters,
and the paradise that awaited them after death (ibid.: 353–4). Though the
leadership of Falun Gong tried to distance themselves from the self-immolations
of 2001, the mass suicides and immolations continued.
Falun Gong’s teachings about illness have also encouraged large numbers
of adherents to effectively suicide through their refusal of medical treatment.
Though illness is seen as an opportunity to work through and expel karma,
seriously ill adherents have died without medical treatment (Palmer 2003: 363).
Li has covered himself by saying that those who died were not practicing the
228 Sacred Suicide
tenets of Falun Gong with the correct attitude and that their practice had not
effected a real change in their psyches (Hongzhi 1998: 33–5). Though the aim
of this practice is not to die but is to gain health, the reality is that a number
of people are dying as a result, from diseases including cancer, heart disease,
and diabetes. The open condemnation of suicide by Falun Gong’s leadership is
disingenuous given the number of followers who have died as a direct result of
their adherence to Falun Gong’s teachings.
References
Ackerman, Susan E. (2005). “Falun Dafa and the New Age Movement in
Malaysia: Signs of Health, Symbols of Salvation,” Social Compass, 52(2):
495–511.
Bejesky, Robert (2004). “Falun Gong and Re-Education through Labor:
Traditional Rehabilitation for the Misdirected to Protect Societal Stability
within China’s Evolving Criminal Justice System,” Columbia Journal of Asian
Law, 17 (Spring): 148–90.
Bell, Mark R., and Taylor C. Boas (2003). “Falun Gong and the Internet:
Evangelism, Community, and Struggle for Survival,” Nova Religio 6(2):
277–93.
Bianco, Lucien (1978). “Peasant Movements,” in Republican China 1912–1949,
eds. J.K. Fairbank and A. Feuerwerker. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, pp. 270–328.
Biggs, Michael (2005). “Dying without Killing: Self-Immolations, 1963–2002,”
in Making Sense of Suicide Missions, ed. Diego Gambetta. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, pp. 173–208.
Burgdoff, Craig A. (2003). “How Falun Gong Practice Undermines Li Hongzhi’s
Totalistic Rhetoric,” Nova Religio 6(6): 332–47.
Chan, Cheris Shun-Ching (2004). “The Falun Gong in China: A Sociological
Perspective,” The China Quarterly 179: 665–83.
Chang, Maria Hsia (2004). Falun Gong: The End of Days. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Chen, Nancy N. (2003). “Healing Sects and Anti-Cult Campaigns,” The China
Quarterly, 174: 505–20.
Cheung, Anne S.Y. (2004). “In Search of a Theory of Cult and Freedom of
Religion in China: The Case of Falun Gong,” Pacific Rim Law & Policy
Journal 13: 1–30.
Death by Whose Hand? 229
Ching, Julie (2001). “The Falun Gong: Religious and Political Implications,”
American Asian Review, 19 (1 January): 1–18.
Fei, Wu (2011). “Suicide, a Modern Problem in China” in Deep China: The
Moral Life of the Person: What Anthropology and Psychiatry tell us about
China Today, eds. Arthur Kleinman, Yunxiang Yan, Jing Jun, Sing Lee and
Everett Zhang. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 213–36.
Fisher, Gareth (2003). “Resistance and Salvation in Falun Gong: The Promise
and Peril of Forbearance,” Nova Religio 6: 294–311.
Hongzhi, Li (1998). “Falun Buddha Fa: Lecture at the First Conference in
North America.” New York.
— (1999a). “Falun Dafa: Lecture in Sydney.” New York.
— (1999b). Falun Gong, rev. English edn. New York: The Universe Publishing
Company.
— (2002). “Essentials for Further Advancement II.” New York.
— (2003). Zhuan Falun: Turning the Law Wheel, English trans., 3rd edn. New
York: The Universe Publishing Company.
Irons, Edward (2003). “Falun Gong and the Sectarian Religion Paradigm,” Nova
Religio 6: 244–62.
Keith, Ronald C., and Zhiqiu Lin (2003). “The ‘Falun Gong Problem’: Politics
and the Struggle for the Rule of Law in China,” The China Quarterly, 175:
623–42.
Lee, Sing (2011). “Depression, Coming of Age in China,” in Deep China: The
Moral Life of the Person: What Anthropology and Psychiatry tell us about
China Today, eds. Arthur Kleinman, Yunxiang Yan, Jing Jun, Sing Lee and
Everett Zhang. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 177–212.
— and Arthur Kleinman (2005). “Suicide as Resistance in Chinese History,” in
Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance, eds. Elizabeth J. Perry and
Mark Selden. London: Routledge, pp. 294–317.
Lester, David (2005). “Suicide and the Chinese Cultural Revolution,” Archives
of Suicide Research 9(1): 99–104.
Leung, Beatrice (2002). “China and Falun Gong: Party and Societal Relations
in the Modern Era,” Journal of Contemporary China 11(33): 761–84.
Lo, Ping-Cheung (1999). “Confucian Views on Suicide and Their Implications
for Euthanasia,” in Confucian Bioethics, ed. Ruiping Fan. Boston, MA:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 624–41.
Lowe, Scott (2003). “Chinese and International Contexts for the Rise of Falun
Gong,” Nova Religio 6(2): 263–76.
Lu, Yunfeng (2005). “Entrepreneurial Logics and the Evolution of Falun Gong,”
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 44(2): 173–85.
作者簡介：
自由撰稿人，曾以原名吳建國在香港《爭鳴》雜誌等報刊發表文章，還以筆名猷子在《北京之春》等刊物發表文章。
曾以六四事件為背景創作的英文舞台劇《Beyond the Gate of Heavenly Peace》曾在墨爾本La Mama劇院上演，並在紐約的La Mama劇院朗讀。
|
