《外交政策》：特朗普应遏制台湾

总统赖清德的言论增加了与中国开战的风险

北春编者按：中共打不打台湾，不是看台湾政权什么态度，而是他能不能打，打对政权会产生什么影响，这是他主要考量的，当然也不排除孤注一掷，川普在对台的态度上不及拜登强硬，拜登甚至表示中共打台可能出兵护台，川普说中共打台不过增加关税二百而已，现在也增加到这个数了。作者以台湾的态度来分析中共会不会打台湾是错误的，打不打台湾应该从中共领导人习近平来分析。就好象普京打不打乌克兰不在于乌克兰加不加入北约，打只要一个借口就可以了。乌克兰还没有加入北约，普京就开打了。按中共对台的底线中共早已可以开打了，无须赖清德说什么。

作者：卡内基国际和平基金会高级研究员克里斯托弗-奇夫维斯（Christopher S. Chivvis）和卡内基国际和平基金会美国国策项目高级研究员斯蒂芬-韦特海姆（Stephen Wertheim）

美国总统乔治-W-布什（George W. Bush）从不以在世界舞台上的克制而闻名，但当台湾总统陈水扁在 2002 年试图推动台湾岛走向独立时，布什派出了他的外交官来遏制美国的民主伙伴。布什总统当时明确告诉中国和全世界，美国反对陈水扁的计划，因为这将激怒北京，助长局势升级，增加战争风险，并可能招致美国的介入。

如今，台湾有了另一位强硬的总统赖清德。今年 3 月，赖清德史无前例地将中国定为 “外国敌对势力”，并公布了 17 项 “积极措施 ”来打击中国对台湾的渗透。北京随后举行了大规模军事演习，模拟对台湾港口和基础设施的封锁和打击。

华盛顿理所当然地谴责了中国的军事升级，但迄今为止却忽视了赖清德更微妙的政治升级。特朗普政府应该在赖清德误认为华盛顿的被动态度是对他的认可，并将美国卷入一场可能带来灾难的战争之前对他加以控制。

引用赖清德在就职演说中的话，自去年 5 月上任以来，他不断采取新的措施来保护和维护台湾作为 “主权、独立国家 ”的地位。他的许多行动，如将台湾的国防开支提高到占 GDP 3% 的目标，以及实施民防培训计划，都是值得欢迎的，也是早该采取的。这些措施改善了台湾岛内的防御，加强了两岸的威慑力。然而，可以预见的是，他的其他举动却与北京针锋相对，毫无益处。

在将中国视为外国敌对势力之前，赖清德发表了几次演讲，在将台湾定位为独立于中国的主权国家方面比其前任走得更远。赖清德并没有提议台湾正式宣布独立，因为此举会越过北京最明确的红线，也不会得到台湾民众的支持。然而，他所采取的是典型的 “萨拉米切片 ”策略，这在很大程度上不为世界各地的观察家所注意，除了那些最重要的观察家：海峡对岸相互瞪视的双方。

赖清德的行动可能会提高他在国内的支持率，但却增加了一场谁都不希望发生的战争的风险。据美国情报机构称，中国国家主席习近平已要求他的军队在 2027 年之前具备夺取台湾的能力，但不一定会下达这样的命令。然而，赖清德的举动使台湾更接近独立，大大增加了习近平要独立的风险。习近平可能会夺取台湾离岛，下令封锁，甚至入侵，理由是如果他现在不采取行动，中国就会错失将台湾永远置于其统治之下的机会。

有人会反对说，中国胁迫台湾是咎由自取，如果也对台湾施压，那就有悖常理了。但是，除非双方都想办法爬下来，否则两岸关系危险升级的轨迹是没有出路的。加强台湾防卫能力的必要性应该突出而不是削弱避免通过言辞挑衅北京的必要性。赖清德的看法显然不同，只有美国有影响力让他改弦更张。

不幸的是，华盛顿至今仍允许赖清德在其雷达之下飞行。美国总统唐纳德-特朗普（Donald Trump）尚未关注台湾问题，他的政府鼓励赖清德加强防务。因此，赖清德可以被原谅地认为，在他引导台湾走向更大独立的过程中，美国是他的后盾。但这一结论还为时过早。台北不应高估美国在任何总统领导下都会为其防务所做的努力。民意调查显示，只有不到三分之一的美国人赞成为台湾开战。台湾在做决定时必须擦亮眼睛，不要以为美国会代表台湾打第三次世界大战。

为了传递正确的信息，特朗普不必重复他在椭圆形办公室与乌克兰总统沃洛德梅尔-泽连斯基（Volodymyr Zelensky）争吵时的丑态。相反，他可以简单地说，美国希望中国和台湾恢复2016年之前的两岸对话。要实现这一目标，台北很可能需要回到其长期以来的立场，即仍然存在某种 “一个中国”。这是一个有用的虚构，北京应该表示欢迎，但台湾却只能空口无凭。要想让赖清德朝这个方向前进，特朗普可能需要向他明确表示，华盛顿反对台湾任何越来越接近独立的举动。考虑到美国在战争中可能付出的代价，这将是一个合理的要求。

特朗普与习近平会晤时，两国领导人还可以讨论就台湾问题公开交换保证。例如，美国可以申明，它将接受任何和平解决两岸分歧的方案，除非得到双方同意，否则在任何情况下都不会支持台湾独立。作为回报，中国可以宣布它没有夺取台湾的时间表，并撤回针对台湾岛的军事姿态和灰色地带行动，这将极大地缓解台湾人民的压力。这样的保证将起到约束赖清德的作用，而且即使中国政府不履行承诺，对台湾防务至关重要的该地区国家也会看到，如果事态进一步升级，中国将承担全部责任。

华盛顿的许多人会谴责向美国的合作伙伴施压和与美国的对手讨价还价的想法。但形势要求我们采取行动。特朗普应该明确表示，赖清德必须停止在台湾独立问题上推波助澜，以保持美国的强大支持。如果布什可以为了维护和平而采取有分寸的政策，特朗普也可以。另一种选择是眼睁睁地看着现状继续恶化，甚至可能到了无法挽回的地步。

（Deepl机器翻译）

Trump Should Rein In Taiwan
President Lai Ching-te’s rhetoric increases the risk of war with China.
By Christopher S. Chivvis, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Stephen Wertheim, a senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

U.S. President George W. Bush will never be known for his restraint on the world stage, but when Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian sought to move the island closer toward independence in 2002, Bush sent his diplomats to rein in America’s democratic partner. The president then flatly told China, and the world, that the United States opposed Chen’s plans, which would provoke Beijing, fuel escalation, and increase the risk of a war that could draw in the United States.

Today, Taiwan has another hard-charging president, Lai Ching-te. In March, Lai designated China as a “foreign hostile force,” an unprecedented step, and unveiled 17 “proactive measures” to combat Chinese infiltration on the island. Beijing followed up with large military drills simulating a blockade and strikes against Taiwan’s ports and infrastructure.

Washington has rightly denounced China’s military escalations, but it has so far overlooked Lai’s subtler political escalations. The Trump administration should rein in Lai before he mistakes Washington’s passivity for approval and entangles the United States in a potentially calamitous war.

Since Lai took office last May, he has continually taken new steps to protect and assert Taiwan’s status as a “sovereign, independent nation,” to quote his inaugural address. Many of his actions, such as boosting Taiwan’s defense spending to target 3 percent of GDP and implementing civil-defense training programs, are welcome and indeed overdue. These measures improve the island’s defenses and strengthen cross-strait deterrence. Yet his other moves have predictably antagonized Beijing for no benefit.

Before deeming China a foreign hostile force, Lai gave several speeches that went significantly further than his predecessors in positioning Taiwan as a sovereign state that is separate from China. Lai is not proposing that Taiwan formally declare itself independent, a move that would cross Beijing’s clearest red line and command little popular support among Taiwanese. He is, however, engaging in classic “salami-slicing” tactics that go largely unnoticed to observers around the world, except the ones that matter most: the parties staring each other down across the strait.

Lai’s actions may boost his domestic support, but they increase the risk of a war that nobody should want. According to U.S. intelligence, Chinese President Xi Jinping has told his military to become capable of seizing the island by 2027 but may not necessarily intend to order such an operation. By moving Taiwan closer toward independence, however, Lai’s moves are greatly increasing the risks that Xi will. Xi could seize Taiwan’s outlying islands, order a blockade, or even invade, reasoning that if he does not act now, China will miss the chance to bring Taiwan under its authority forever.

Some will object that because China bears blame for coercing Taiwan, it would be perverse to pressure the latter as well. But there is no plausible exit from the dangerous, escalatory trajectory of cross-strait relations unless both sides find ways to climb down. The need to strengthen Taiwan’s defense capabilities should accentuate, not diminish, the need to avoid poking Beijing through rhetoric. Lai clearly sees things differently, and only the United States has the leverage to make him change course.

Unfortunately, Washington has so far allowed Lai to fly under its radar. U.S. President Donald Trump has yet to focus on Taiwan, and his administration has encouraged Lai’s defense buildup. Lai could thus be forgiven for thinking that America has his back as he steers Taiwan toward greater independence. But this conclusion would be premature. Taipei should not overestimate what the United States, under any president, would do in its defense. Polls show that scarcely more than one-third of Americans would favor going to war for Taiwan. Taiwan must make decisions with clear eyes and not assume the United States will fight World War III on its behalf.

To deliver the right message, Trump need not repeat the ugliness of his Oval Office spat with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Instead, he can simply say the United States wants China and Taiwan to resume the cross-strait dialogue that existed prior to 2016. Getting there would likely require Taipei to return to its long-standing position that there still exists “one China” of some kind. This is a useful fiction that Beijing should welcome yet costs Taiwan nothing but words. To get Lai to move in this direction might require Trump to make clear to him that Washington opposes any moves by Taiwan to inch closer and closer to independence. Given the costs the United States could pay in the event of a war, this would be a reasonable request.

When Trump meets with Xi, the leaders could also discuss a public exchange of assurances over Taiwan. The United States could, for example, affirm that it would accept any peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences and would under no circumstances support Taiwan’s independence, except with the consent of both sides. In return, China could declare that it has no timeline for seizing Taiwan and pull back on its military posturing and gray-zone operations targeting the island, offering a great relief to the Taiwanese people. Such assurances would serve to restrain Lai, and even if Beijing did not live up to its commitments, countries in the region, which are crucial to Taiwan’s defense, would see that China bears sole responsibility for any further escalation.

Many in Washington will decry the idea of pressuring a U.S. partner and bargaining with a U.S. adversary. But the situation demands action. Trump should make clear that Lai must stop pushing the envelope on Taiwan’s independence in order to retain strong backing from the United States. If Bush could adopt a measured policy in the interest of preserving peace, so can Trump. The alternative is to watch the status quo continue to deteriorate, potentially to the point of no return.

Link：https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/05/01/trump-taiwan-china-war-military/