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原题：赵紫阳逝世--对英烈的恐惧自古已有之
萧政峰 译
为什么中国政府如此强烈地要表示前共产党总书记赵紫阳的一生不应该赞美，他的逝世应该默默无闻呢？
原因是赵紫阳扮演了一个使中国政府经常极度不安的角色。这个角色就是在一个被严格控制的政治环境下不断坚持改革和开放的勇敢、有远见的改革者。过去在一个时期里贵为国家领导人的赵，曾利用他的权力和影响为被总是排斥在决策圈子之外的人们打开一个议政的渠道。当他在共产党的元老的反对下坚持这条路线的时候他不可避免地被抛弃了。
自公元前7世纪起至今，在中国悠久的历史中很多人也扮演了类似的角色。这些改革者往往被他们的同僚所迫害。如此造就了中国丰富的具有强烈感召力的英烈文化。
中国近代史里不乏这类标志着重大政治变更的英烈。清末就有这样的戏剧性的事例。公元1898年，中国的政治制度看上去还是亘古不变，已经适应不了新世界的市场经济和军事力量。清朝皇帝自己曾试图邀请有见地的学者进入朝廷来开放政治制度，这些学者推介了发展经济和税务体系的计划，教育制度的革新，发展新闻业，并且开始了宪政与公民议政的讨论。还不到一年，保守的反对派聚集力量，皇帝被幽禁深宫，六个最敢直言的改革者被捕斩决。尽管改革代表了更广泛的社会力量，1898年间的改革却从此与这六君子的名字连在一起。
清跨台的第二年，1912年，尽管知道多么的危险，有人还是促成了类似的对当局的挑战。一个在中国1912年末举行的首次选举中显露头角的政治家对具有集权和军阀倾向的临时大总统提出挑战以后，在上海火车站被枪杀。1920年代，当蒋介石在国民党内部巩固权力之时，他的一个最亲近的幕僚试图增加左派的参与和使政府更多地响应民意，这个人也被暗杀了。1946年，著名诗人闻一多曾怒斥政府对想开放国民党的开明派的暴力。闻一多也在刚刚做了一个充满激情的讲演质问政府敢不敢对他采取行动后被枪杀了。
很多同样的事例在中华人民共和国的历史里也存在。1976年，当几千人在天安门广场示威悼念周恩来，而邓小平正在为死去的总理周恩来致悼词的时候，是邓小平在要求改革，尽管是虚张声势，他还是被再次在党内撤职。1987年，邓亲自提拔的党的总书记胡耀邦因为对待日益高涨的民主运动手软而被废黜。
接替了胡耀邦的赵紫阳步入了胡的后尘。他试图使政府对天安门广场抗议的学生市民提出的更多政治参与的要求做出正面的反响。当军队被调入镇压，赵流了眼泪，为此这个世界将他铭记。
与其他早期的改革者不同的是，他在北京的住所被幽禁度过了15年的余生。他提出的政治开放被搁置，替而代之的是他早几年制定的发展市场经济的计划被加冕为中国经济蓬勃发展的基本政策。中国政府剥夺他理应得到的国葬和对他功绩应有的承认，的确显得有一点恶意中伤。
但是如果历史有一点指导作用的话，拨乱反正总是会到来的。中国政府已经修正了赵紫阳葬礼的强硬政策，允许星期六在北京举行赵的追悼仪式。他们最惧怕的可能是赵紫阳加入众多的留名史册的前世改革英烈的行列。
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史景迁(Jonathan Spence), 世界著名汉学家、历史学家，现任美国历史学会主席。
原载《纽约时报》2005年1月28日
原文：
Zhao's passing: An ancient fear of martyrs
Jonathan Spence
The New York Times
Friday, January 28, 2005
NEW HAVEN, Connecticut Why has the Chinese government been so intent on showing that the former Communist Party chief Zhao Ziyang was a man whose life should not be celebrated and whose death should pass unsung?
Zhao played a role that has often made Chinese governments deeply uneasy: that of a bold and visionary reformer who insistently calls for change and openness in a tightly controlled political environment. Saluted for a time as one of the leaders of the country, Zhao sought to use his power and visibility to grant a hearing to the voices of those excluded from the inner circles where decisions were normally made. And when he persisted in this course in the face of opposition from senior party leaders, he had to be discarded.
Many others have played similar roles in China's long history, from as early as the seventh century B.C. Often, those seeking reforms were punished by their own colleagues, so that the concept of reform led to the construction in China of an elaborate and emotionally powerful martyrology.
China's recent history is studded with such cases that also serve as markers for major political shifts. Near the end of the Qing dynasty, there was a dramatic example. In 1898, China's political structure seemed frozen in time, unable to adjust to a new world's market and military forces.
The emperor himself tried to open up the system by inviting independent-minded scholars to the court, where they introduced plans to develop the economy and tax system, transform education, develop the press, and begin discussion of constitutional government and popular participation in decision-making.
Before the year was out, the conservative opponents rallied, the emperor was placed under a form of palace arrest, and six of the most outspoken reformers were arrested and summarily executed. The reform movement of 1898 became associated with the names of these six martyrs, though indeed they had spoken for a much larger constituency.
In the years after the dynasty's fall in 1912, other individuals mounted similar challenges, knowing how high the risks might be. One politician who had risen to prominence in China's first republican elections, held in late 1912, challenged the centralizing and militaristic tendencies of China's interim president; he was gunned down in the Shanghai railway station.
When Chiang Kai-shek was consolidating his power over the Nationalist Party in the 1920s, one of his closest lieutenants sought to increase the participation of leftists and to shift the government onto a more populist course. He, too, was shot dead.
In 1946, the popular poet Wen Yiduo cried out in anger against what he saw as government coercion against the liberals who were trying to open up the Nationalist Party. Wen was shot and killed, just after giving a passionate speech daring the government to take action against him.
The list could be expanded with many figures in the People's Republic. In 1976, after his speech of homage to the deceased Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, when the people of Beijing demonstrated in thousands on Tiananmen Square, it was Deng Xiaoping who seemed to be demanding change; for that bravado, he was purged from the party for a second time. In 1987, Hu Yaobang, the party chief who was one of Deng's new protégés, fell from grace because he was considered too soft on the fledgling democracy movement.
Hu was replaced by Zhao Ziyang, who fell in his turn as he tried to persuade the government to respond more favorably to some of the ideas for greater political participation being framed so vociferously by the demonstrating citizens and students of Tiananmen Square. As the guns were being brought in, Zhao wept, and for that the world remembers him.
In contrast to many earlier reformers, Zhao was allowed to live out the 15 years of life that remained to him in house arrest in Beijing. But the main issues he had raised about political openness were not addressed. Instead, it was the market-energizing plans, which he had formulated in earlier years, that were enshrined as basic policies for China's boom economy. It did seem like petty spite for China's government to refuse Zhao a full state funeral and to deny him the credit that was his due.
But, if the past is any guide, there will be a kind of corrective justice. China's leaders are already modifying their tough stance on the funeral arrangements, allowing a memorial ceremony for Zhao in Beijing on Saturday. The last thing they probably want is for Zhao to join the long list of reforming martyrs who have made their mark before him.
(Jonathan Spence, a professor of modern Chinese history at Yale University, is the author, most recently, of ‘‘Treason by the Book.’’)
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