本法案原文來自Rubio 卢比奥议员的政府网站，标题为Rubio, Menendez Applaud Senate Passage of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act

SEP 11 2019

https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/9/rubio-menendez-applaud-senate-passage-of-the-uyghur-human-rights-policy-act

出於尊重司法體系文案格式的需要，译者沒有修改英文原文的排版——译者 Zu Wang （钟山）

———以下為原文及翻譯——-

DAV19069 S.L.C.

S. ll

To condemn gross human rights violations of ethnic Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, and calling for an end to arbitrary detention, torture, and harassment of these communities inside and outside China.

S. ll

 谴责严重侵犯新疆突厥族穆斯林人权的行为，并呼吁停止对中国境内外这些社区的任意拘留，酷刑和骚扰。

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

在美国的参议院席内

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Mr. RUBIO introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on

鲁比奥先生介绍了以下法案; （被两次阅读），并提交委员会llllllllll

 llllllllll

A BILL

To condemn gross human rights violations of ethnic Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, and calling for an end to arbitrary detention, torture, and harassment of these communities inside and outside China.

法案

 谴责严重侵犯新疆突厥族穆斯林人权的行为，并呼吁停止对中国境内外这些社区的任意拘留，酷刑和骚扰。

116TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION

第116届国会第一届会议

  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

 由美国参议院和美国众议院在国会中制定，第1部分。简短标题。

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2019’’.

该法案可能被称为“2019年维吾尔人权政策法案”。

SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE.

The purpose of this Act is to direct United States resources to address gross violations of universally recognized human rights, including the mass internment of over 1,000,000 Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities in China ，and the intimidation and threats faced by United States citizens and legal permanent residents.

SEC.  2.目的声明

 该法案的目的是指导美国资源处理严重侵犯公认人权的行为，包括大规模拘留中国境内超过1,000,000名维吾尔族和其他主要是穆斯林的少数民族以及對美国公民和合法永久性居民面临的恐吓和威胁。

SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.

SEC.  3.适当的国会委员会

In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means—

在本节中，“适当的国会委员会”一词是指 -

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

（1）对外关系委员会，武装部队委员会，情报特别委员会，银行，住房和城市事务委员会，司法委员会和参议院拨款委员会;和

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

（2）外交事務委員會，武裝部隊委員會，情報常設委員會，財務委員會，司法委員會和眾議院撥款委員會。

SEC. 4. FINDINGS.

SEC. 4.結果

Congress makes the following findings:

國會作出以下調查結果：

(1) The Government of the People’s Republic of

China (PRC) has a long history of repressing ap- proximately 13,000,000 Turkic, moderate Sunni

（1）中華人民共和國政府
中國（中國）長期以來一直壓制大約13,000,000突厥，溫和的遜尼派

DAV19069 S.L.C. 3（進入第三頁 分頁編號）

1 Muslims, particularly Uyghurs, in the nominally au-

2 tonomous Xinjiang region. These actions are in con-

3 travention of international human rights standards,

4 including the Universal Declaration of Human

5 Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and

6 Political Rights.

穆斯林，特別是維吾爾人，名義上自治的新疆地區。這些行動違反了國際人權標準，包括“世界人權宣言”和“公民權利和政治權利國際公約”。

7 (2) In recent decades, central and regional Chi-

8 nese government policies have systematically dis-

9 criminated against Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and

10 other Muslims in Xinjiang by denying them a range

11 of civil and political rights, including the freedoms of

12 expression, religion, movement, and a fair trial,

13 among others.

（2）近幾十年來，中央和地區的中央政府政策系統地歧視維吾爾族，哈薩克族和新疆的其他穆斯林，剝奪了他們的一系列公民權利和政治權利，包括言論自由，宗教信仰，運動自由，以及公平審判等等。

14 (3) Increased unrest in the Xinjiang region as

15 a result of the central government’s severe repres-

16 sion is used in Orwellian fashion by the Government

17 of the People’s Republic of China as evidence of

18 ‘‘terrorism’’ and ‘‘separatism’’ and as an excuse for

19 further disproportionate response.

（3）由於中央政府的嚴厲鎮壓，新疆地區的動亂加劇，這被中華人民共和國政府用作奧威爾式的“恐怖主義”和“分裂主義”的證據，並作為藉口進一步不合比例的反應。

20 (4) In 2014, Chinese authorities launched their

21 latest ‘‘Strike Hard against Violent Extremism’’

22 campaign, in which the pretext of wide-scale, inter-

23 nationally linked threats of terrorism were used to

24 justify pervasive restrictions on, and gross human

（4）自從2014年，針對新疆少数民族社區，中国当局发起了他们最近期的“抵制暴力极端主义”运动，其中以大规模，国际联系的恐怖主义威胁为借口，用来合理化普遍存在的限制和严重侵犯人权的行为。

DAV19069 S.L.C. 4（第四頁）

1 rights violations of, the ethnic minority communities

2 of Xinjiang.（譯文見前項）

3 (5) Those policies included—

4 (A) pervasive, high-tech surveillance across

5 the region, including the arbitrary collection of

6 biodata, including DNA samples from children,

7 without their knowledge or consent;

（5）该等政策包括─

 （A）在整个地区进行普遍的高科技监测，包括在不知情或不同意的情况下任意收集生物数据，包括儿童的DNA样本;

8 (B) the use of QR codes outside homes to

9 gather information on how frequently individ-

10 uals pray;

（B）在家外使用QR码收集个人祈祷频率的信息;

11 (C) facial and voice recognition software

12 and ‘‘predictive policing’’ databases; and

13 (D) severe restrictions on the freedom of

14 movement across the region.

（C）面部和语音识别软件和“预测警务”数据库; （D）严格限制整个地区的行动自由。

15 (6) Chinese security forces have never been held

16 accountable for credible reports of mass shootings in

17 Alaqagha (2014), Hanerik (2013), and Siriqbuya

18 (2013), as well as the extrajudicial killings of

19 Abdulbasit Ablimit (2013) and Rozi Osman (2014).

（6）中国安全部队从未对Alaqagha（2014），Hanerik（2013）和Siriqbuya（2013）的大规模枪击事件的持有可靠报道，以及包括法外杀害Abdulbasit Ablimit（2013）和Rozi Osman（  2014）。

20 (7)(A) The August 2016 transfer of former

21 Tibet Autonomous Region Party Secretary Chen

22 Quanguo to become the Xinjiang Party Secretary

23 prompted an acceleration in the crackdown across

24 the region.

（7）（A）2016年8月前西藏自治区党委书记陈全国转为新疆党委书记，促使该地区的镇压行动加快。

DAV19069 S.L.C. 5(第五頁）

1 (B) Local officials in Xinjiang have used

2 chilling political rhetoric to describe the purpose of

3 government policy including ‘‘eradicating tumors’’

4 and ‘‘spray[ing] chemicals’’ on crops to kill the

5 ‘‘weeds’’.

（B）新疆的地方官员使用令人毛骨悚然的政治言论来描述政府政策的目的，包括“根除肿瘤”和“喷洒化学物质”作物以杀死“杂草”。

6 (C) Uyghurs are forced to celebrate Chinese

7 cultural traditions, such as Chinese New Year, and

8 unique Uyghur culture is facing eradication due to

9 state control over Uyghur cultural heritage, such as

10 muqam (a musical tradition) and meshrep (tradi-

11 tional cultural gatherings), and due to elimination of

12 the Uyghur language as a medium of instruction in

13 Xinjiang schools and universities.

（三）维吾尔人被迫庆祝中国的文化传统，如中国新年。由于国家对维吾尔族文化遗产的控制，例如muqam（音乐传统）和meshrep（传统文化聚会），并且由于取消了维吾尔语作为新疆学校和大学的教学语言,维吾尔文化面临着被根除。

14 (8) In 2017, credible reports found that family

15 members of Uyghurs living outside of China had

16 gone missing inside China, that Chinese authorities

17 were pressuring those outside the country to return,

18 and that individuals were being arbitrarily detained

19 in large numbers.

（8）2017年，可靠的报告发现，居住在中国境外的维吾尔族家庭成员在中国境内失踪，中国当局向国外的人施压，要求他们返回，并且个人被大量任意拘留。

20 (9) There is ample credible evidence provided

21 by scholars, human rights organizations, journalists,

22 and think tanks substantiating the establishment by

23 Chinese authorities of ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps.

（9）学者，人权组织，记者和智囊团提供了充分的可靠证据，证明中国当局建立了“政治教育”营地。

24 (10) Independent organizations conducted

25 interviews, including testimonies from Kayrat

（10）独立组织进行了采访，包括Kayrat的证词

DAV19069 S.L.C. 6

1 Samarkan, Omir Bekali, and Mihrigul Tursun, along

2 with others who had been detained in such facilities,

3 who described forced political indoctrination, torture,

4 beatings, food deprivation, and solitary confinement,

5 as well as uncertainty as to the length of detention,

6 humiliation, and denial of religious, cultural, and lin-

7 guistic freedoms, and confirmed that they were told

8 by guards that the only way to secure release was

9 to demonstrate sufficient political loyalty.

Samarkan，Omir Bekali和Mihrigul Tursun，以及其他被拘留在這些設施中的人，他們描述了強迫政治灌輸，酷刑，毆打，食物匱乏和單獨監禁，以及無法統計時間拘留的，羞辱，並且否認宗教，文化和語言自由，並確認被警衛人員告訴他們，獲得釋放的唯一方法是表現出足夠的政治忠誠。

 Poor con-

10 ditions and lack of medical treatment at such facili-

11 ties appear to have contributed to the deaths of

12 some detainees, including the elderly and infirm.

這些設施的條件惡劣和缺乏醫療明顯導致一些被拘留者死亡，包括老人和體弱者。

13 Uyghurs Muhammed Salih Hajim (2018), Yaqupjan

14 Naman (2018), Abdughappar Abdujappar (2018),

15 Ayhan Memet (2018), Abdulreshit Seley Hajim

16 (2018), Nurimangul Memet (2018), Adalet Teyip

17 (2018), Abdulehed Mehsum (2017), Hesen Imin

18 (2017), and Sawut Raxman (2017) reportedly died

19 while in the custody of the Chinese authorities in

20 ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps, without proper inves-

21 tigation of the circumstances.

Uyghurs Muhammed Salih Hajim（2018），Yaqupjan Naman（2018），Abdughappar Abdujappar（2018），Ayhan Memet（2018），Abdulreshit Seley Hajim（2018），Nurimangul Memet（2018），Adalet Teyip（2018），Abdulehed Mehsum（2017）據報導，Hesen Imin（2017年）和Sawut Raxman（2017年）在沒有經過適當調查的情況下，在“政治教育”營地中被中國當局拘留期間去世。

22 (11) Uyghurs and Kazakhs, who have now ob-

23 tained permanent residence or citizenship in other

24 countries, attest to receiving threats and harassment

25 from Chinese officials.

維吾爾人和哈薩克人現已在其他國家獲得永久居留或公民身份，證明他們受到中國官員的威脅和騷擾。

DAV19069 S.L.C. 7

1 (12) Under pressure from the Government of

2 the People’s Republic of China, countries have forc-

3 ibly returned Uyghurs to China in violation of the

4 non-refoulement principle and their well-founded

5 fear of persecution. 

（12）在中國政府的壓力下，各國不得不將維吾爾人遣返中國，這違反了不驅回原則及其違法了有充分理由的迫害恐懼的原則。

States returning Uyghurs in-

6 clude Egypt (2017), the United Arab Emirates

7 (2017), Malaysia (2011, 2013), Thailand (2011,

8 2015), Laos (2010), Burma (2010), Cambodia

9 (2009), Vietnam (2014), Kazakhstan (1999, 2001,

10 2003, 2006), Uzbekistan (2007), Tajikistan (2011),

11 Pakistan (2003, 2009, 2011), Nepal (2002), and

12 India (2016).

返回維吾爾族的國家包括埃及（2017年），阿拉伯聯合酋長國（2017年），馬來西亞（2011年，2013年），泰國（2011年，2015年），老撾（2010年），緬甸（2010年），柬埔寨（2009年），越南（2014年） ，哈薩克斯坦（1999年，2001,2003,2006），烏茲別克斯坦（2007年），塔吉克斯坦（2011年），巴基斯坦（2003年，2009年，2011年），尼泊爾（2002年）和印度（2016年）。

13 (13) Six journalists for Radio Free Asia’s

14 Uyghur service have publicly detailed abuses their

15 family members in Xinjiang have endured in re-

16 sponse to their work exposing abusive policies across

17 the region.

（13）自由亞洲電台維吾爾族服務的六名記者公開詳細報導了他們在新疆的家人為應對他們在該地區暴露濫用政策的工作而遭受的虐待。

18 (14) Several United States-based companies are

19 conducting business with Xinjiang authorities with-

20 out sufficient due diligence or safeguards to ensure

21 their business operations do not create or contribute

22 to human rights violations.

（14）一些美國公司正在與新疆當局開展業務，但沒有充分的干預或保障措施，以確保其業務運營不會造成或助長侵犯人權行為。

23 (15) The Government of the People’s Republic

24 of China is increasingly investing in the ‘‘Belt and

25 Road Initiative’’ across Xinjiang and throughout

DAV19069 S.L.C. 8

1 Central Asia, extending its influence through organi-

2 zations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-

3 tion without regard to the political, cultural, or lin-

4 guistic rights of ethnic minorities.

（15）中華人民共和國政府越來越多地投資於新疆和整個中亞的“一帶一路”倡議，通過上海合作組織等組織擴大其影響力，而不考慮政治，文化，或少數民族的語言權利。

5 (16) The Secretary of State, Congressional-Ex-

6 ecutive Commission on China, Tom Lantos Human

7 Rights Commission, and individual members of the

8 executive branch and Congress have all expressed

9 growing concern regarding the pervasive human

10 rights abuses across Xinjiang and the ‘‘political re-

11 education’’ camps.

（16）國務卿，國會中國執行委員會，湯姆蘭托斯人權委員會以及行政部門和國會的個人成員都對新疆普遍存在的侵犯人權行為和“政治再教育營”表示了越來越多的關注。

12 (17) In August 2018, the United Nations Com-

13 mittee to Eliminate Racial Discrimination challenged

14 the Government of the People’s Republic of China

15 over abuses in Xinjiang, including the establishment

16 of mass arbitrary detention camps.

（17）2018年8月，聯合國消除種族歧視委員會向中華民國政府提出了新疆侵權行為的質疑，包括建立大規模任意拘留營。

17 (18) Between August and September 2018,

18 Chinese authorities responded to these allegations by

19 either flatly denying them or insisting that the facili-

20 ties are ‘‘vocational training centers’’.

（18）2018年8月至9月期間，中國當局對這些指控做出了回應，要么斷然否認這些指控，要么堅稱這些設施是“職業培訓中心”。

21 (19) In September 2018, newly appointed

22 United Nations High Commissioner for Human

23 Rights Michele Bachelet noted in her first speech as

24 High Commissioner the ‘‘deeply disturbing allega-

25 tions of large-scale arbitrary detentions of Uighurs

DAV19069 S.L.C. 9

1 and other Muslim communities, in so-called re-edu-

2 cation camps across Xinjiang’’.

（19）2018年9月，新任命的聯合國人權事務高級專員米歇爾·巴切萊特在她的第一次高級專員講話中指出，“對維吾爾族和其他穆斯林社區進行大規模任意拘留的令人深感不安的指控，即所謂的遍佈新疆的教育營地。

3 (20) On September 18, 2018, the Washington

4 Post editorial board wrote, ‘‘At stake is not just the

5 welfare of the Uighurs, but also whether the tech-

6 nologies of the 21st century will be employed to

7 smother human freedom.’’

（20）2018年9月18日，華盛頓郵報的編輯委員會寫道，“利害攸關的不僅僅是維吾爾人的福利，還有21世紀的技術是否會被用來扼殺人類的自由。”

8 (21) In December 2018 testimony before the

9 Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and Inter-

10 national Cybersecurity Policy of the Committee on

11 Foreign Relations of the Senate, Deputy Assistant

12 Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

13 Scott Busby testified that the number of those de-

14 tained in camps since April 2017 was ‘‘at least

15 800,000 and possibly more than 2 million’’.

（21）2018年12月，參議院外交關係委員會，民主，人權和勞工局副助理部長斯科特·巴斯比的東亞，太平洋和國際網絡安全政策小組委員會作證，證實被拘留者人數自2017年4月以來，在難民營中“至少有15 800,000，可能超過200萬”。

16 (22) In December 2018, independent media re-

17 ports pointed to growing evidence of forced labor in

18 the camps, as well as reports of individuals who have

19 been released from camps being forced to labor in

20 nearby factories for low wages under threat of being

21 sent back to ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps.

（22）2018年12月，獨立媒體報導指出越來越多的證據顯示難民營中有強迫勞動，並且有報告說，從營地被釋放的人被迫在附近的工廠以低工資做勞工，否則被威脅被送回“政治再教育”陣營。

22 (23) In December 2018 and January 2019,

23 Chinese officials organized visits to ‘‘political reedu-

24 cation’’ camps in Xinjiang for a small group of for-

25 eign journalists and diplomats from 12 non-Western

DAV19069 S.L.C. 10

1 countries. In the months preceding the visits, inter-

2 national media reported that officials worked to re-

3 move security features from some ‘‘political reeduca-

4 tion’’ facilities, and coached detainees and area resi-

5 dents not to make negative comments about the

6 camps. Reports also indicated that officials had

7 transferred large numbers of detainees to detention

8 facilities in other parts of China.

（23）2018年12月和2019年1月，中國官員組織了來自12個非西方國家的一小群外國記者和外交官訪問新疆的“政治教育”營地。在訪問之前的幾個月裡，國際媒體報導說，官員們努力從一些“政治教育”設施中拆除安全設備痕跡，並勒令被拘留者和當地居民不要對營地做出負面評論。報告還指出，官員已將大量被拘留者轉移到中國其他地區的拘留所。

9 (24) Experts have described the Xinjiang region

10 as ‘‘a police state to rival North Korea, with a for-

11 malized racism on the order of South African apart-

12 heid’’ and the repression in the Xinjiang region as

13 a ‘‘slow motion Tiananmen’’.

（24）專家們將新疆地區描述為“與朝鮮競爭的警察國家，如同南非種族隔離的正式種族主義”以及新疆地區的“慢動作天安門”的鎮壓。

14 SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

15 It is the sense of Congress that—

16 (1) the President should condemn abuses

17 against Turkic Muslims by Chinese authorities in

18 Xinjiang and call on Chinese President Xi Jinping

19 to recognize the profound abuse and likely lasting

20 damage of China’s current policies, and immediately

21 close the ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps, lift all re-

22 strictions on and ensure respect for internationally

23 guaranteed human rights across the region, and

24 allow for reestablishment of contact between those

25 inside and outside China;

國會的意見是 - 

 （1）總統應該譴責中國當局在新疆對突厥穆斯林的虐待，並呼籲中國國家主席習近平承認針對中國現行政策的深刻濫用和不易持久的破壞，並立即關閉“政治教育”陣營，解除 所有限制並確保尊重整個地區的國際保障人權，並允許重新建立中國國內外的聯繫;

DAV19069 S.L.C. 11

1 (2) the United States Government should de-

2 velop a strategy to support the United Nations High

3 Commissioner for Human Rights and numerous

4 United Nations Special Rapporteurs’ urgent calls for

5 immediate and unfettered access to Xinjiang, includ-

6 ing the ‘‘political reeducation’’ camps and instruct

7 representatives of the United States at the United

8 Nations to use the voice and vote of the United

9 States to condemn the mass arbitrary detainment,

10 torture, and forced labor of Turkic Muslims in the

11 People’s Republic of China;

（2）美國政府應制定一項戰略，支持聯合國人權事務高級專員和許多聯合國特別報告員緊急呼籲立即和不受限制地進入新疆，包括“政治再教育”營地; 並指示美國駐聯合國代表利用美國的聲音和投票權來譴責中華人民共和國境內對突厥穆斯林的大規模任意拘留，酷刑和強迫勞動;

12 (3)  should consider the

13 applicability of existing authorities, including the

14 Global Magnitsky Act (subtitle F of Public Law

15 114–328), to impose targeted sanctions on members

16 of the Government of the People’s Republic of

17 China, the Chinese Communist Party, and state se-

18 curity apparatus, including Xinjiang Party Secretary

19 Chen Quanguo and other officials credibly alleged to

20 be responsible for human rights abuses in Xinjiang

21 and elsewhere;

（3）國務卿應考慮現有權力機構的適用性，包括“全球馬格尼茨基法案”（公法114-328副標題F），對中華人民共和國政府，中國共產黨政府成員實施有針對性的製裁,中國共產黨和國家安全機構，包括新疆黨委書記陳全國和其他官員，可信地指控他們在新疆和其他地方侵犯人權;

22 (4) the Secretary of State should fully imple-

23 ment the provisions of the Frank Wolf International

24 Religious Freedom Act (Public Law 114–281) and

25 consider strategically employing sanctions and other

DAV19069 S.L.C. 12

1 tools under the International Religious Freedom Act

2 (22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq.) and to employ measures re-

3 quired as part of the ‘‘Country of Particular Con-

4 cern’’ (CPC) designation for the Government of the

5 People’s Republic of China that directly address par-

6 ticularly severe violations of religious freedom;

（4）國務卿應充分執行“弗蘭克沃爾夫國際宗教自由法”（公法114-281）的規定，並考慮根據“國際宗教自由法”（22 USC 6401 et seq。）戰略性地採用制裁和其他工具。指對中華人民共和國政府作為的“特別關注國家”（CPC）中的一部分，直接針對其特別嚴重的宗教自由侵犯行為採取必要的措施;

7 (5) the Secretary of Commerce should review

8 and consider the prohibition on the sale or provision

9 of any United States-made goods or services to any

10 state agent in Xinjiang, and add the Xinjiang

11 branch of the Chinese Communist Party, the

12 Xinjiang Public Security Bureau, and the Xinjiang

13 Office of the United Front Work Department, or

14 any entity acting on their behalf to facilitate the

15 mass internment or forced labor of Turkic Muslims,

16 to the ‘‘Entity List’’ administered by the Depart-

17 ment of Commerce;

（5）商務部應審議和考慮禁止銷售或提供任何美國製品和服務給任何國家在新疆的代理公司，以及新疆共產黨分支機構，新疆公安局和新疆職業局工作室，或代表他們行事的任何實體，以促進針對突厥穆斯林人士的大規模拘禁或強迫勞動，（以上列入）到商務部管理的“實體清單”;

18 (6) the Secretary of State should explore appro-

19 priate mechanisms to establish a voluntary database

20 to which United States citizens or permanent resi-

21 dent family members of the Uyghur diaspora can

22 provide details about missing family members, with

23 a view towards pressing for information and ac-

24 countability from the Government of the People’s

25 Republic of China, and take appropriate measures to

DAV19069 S.L.C. 13

1 expedite the asylum claims of Uyghurs, Kazakhs,

2 and other Turkic Muslim minorities;

（6）國務卿應探索建立自願數據庫的適當機制，維吾爾族僑民的美國公民或永久居民家庭成員可以提供有關失踪家庭成員的詳細信息，以期向政府提供信息和問責 中華人民共和國，並採取適當措施加快維吾爾族，哈薩克族和其他突厥穆斯林少數民族的庇護申請;

3 (7) United States companies and individuals

4 selling goods or services or otherwise operating in

5 Xinjiang should take steps, including in any public

6 or financial filings, to publicly assert that their com-

7 mercial activities are not contributing to human

8 rights violations in Xinjiang or elsewhere in China

9 and that their supply chains are not compromised by

10 forced labor;

（7）在新疆銷售商品或服務或以其他方式經營的美國公司和個人應採取措施，包括在任何公共或財務備案中公開宣稱其商業活動沒有助長新疆或中國其他地區的侵犯人權行為；以及他們的供應鏈不會受到強迫勞動的損害；

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